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19 August 1975

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Report on Meeting with Mr. Fred Kirschstein,
Member of Staff, Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. House of Representatives

1. This memorandum summarizes the conversation which took place during my meeting with Mr. Kirschstein 1630-1745, 18 August. I met with Mr. Kirschstein on request and instructions of Mr. William Parmenter, D/OCI, acting for Mr. Paul Walsh, ADDI, absent on leave, and as Acting Chief, Collection Guidance and Assessments Staff (CGAS) in absence of [REDACTED] Chief, CGAS, also on leave. At my request, [REDACTED] Chief, DDI Executive Staff was present during the meeting as an "observer."

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2. During the early part of the meeting--at Mr. Kirschstein's request--I reviewed the principal functions of CGAS, its organization, and the nature and purpose of its activities both within CIA and "outside" with the other intelligence agencies. In the course of these remarks, I also gave him a general description of processes involved in generating and coordinating requirements and guidance for the collection and reporting of intelligence information by various sources, insuring action on them, and assessing and evaluating the results from such action.

3. Mr. Kirschstein indicated when he asked me for a brief on CGAS that his mission was to identify overlap, duplication, and waste in the technical intelligence collection effort. Later in the meeting he re-defined the job slightly--as identifying overlap, duplication, and waste in overseas collection activities. He asked me repeatedly during the meeting for evidence of overlap, duplication, and waste in such activities. I told him that I could not cite and did not know of any instances of undesirable or unnecessary overlap

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or duplication in collection. I spoke to him instead about the differing and sometimes unique information potential of the various sources, the benefits of complementary source materials, the differences in timeliness of information provided by the several sources, and the value of redundancy in reporting (corroboration verification, clarification, negation, etc.). I also outlined a number of organizational and managerial arrangements which in their evolution over the years, by design or effect, worked to minimize undesirable overlap or duplication in collection, viz:

- . Specification by DCI, USIB, or higher authority of objectives (subjects of intelligence concern) and priorities,
- . Establishment of services of common concern, e.g., [] NPIC and other centralization of responsibilities for functions related to collection and reporting of information, e.g. CGAS, the requirements coordination mechanisms administered by the USIB SIGINT Committee, COMIREX, and the Human Sources Committee, and
- . Decentralization technique (in contrast to centralization noted above) whereby responsibilities are allocated--divided--by agreement among agencies, e.g., for preparation of detailed photo-interpretation reports on various subjects.

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
4. In response to other questions asked by Mr. Kirschstein during the interview, I:

- . Reviewed the typical procedures used by CGAS to evaluate, in collaboration with production offices, reporting by a CIA covert intercept site.
- . Stated that to my knowledge CIA did not have a "communications cryptology" capability.

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5. I could not answer several of Mr. Kirschstein's questions and either told him I did not know the answer or that it was beyond my competence. These questions were:

- . Degree of duplication or redundancy in telemetry collected on Soviet missile firings?
- . Necessity for Army, Navy, and Air Force to have their own scientific and technical intelligence organizations (FSTC, FTD, and STIC)?
- . Identification of clandestine sources of the Army?

6. During the final minutes of the interview, Mr. Kirschstein stated that he wanted to obtain detailed information about the U.S. airborne peripheral reconnaissance program. He referred to his earlier questions about violation of Chinese and North Korean airspace by U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and said that "people keep coming in to tell us about such violations. Specifically, he said he would like information on:

- . Where missions are flown. How often.
- . Operational constraints on pilot (duration and depth of penetration of denied areas was at discretion of pilot to his understanding).

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- . Safeguards for abort or inadvertent over-flight.
- . Violations of other nations airspace. When. Where, etc.
- . Officials or departments that authorize aerial penetration procedures.
- . Purposes of penetration.

Since he had indicated that he wished to terminate the interview, I suggested that these questions be submitted "through channels" (which he didn't seem to know). He seemed to accept my suggestion.

7. I did not give any "documents" to Mr. Kirschstein.



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Collection Guidance and Assessments Staff

cc: DDI
Chief, CGAS

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